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Abstract
British voters have decided to withdraw membership from the European Union (EU). By
considering the outcome of Brexit as a moment in time when British voters declared, “this is
who we are,” this project asks: What role did identity play in the Brexit vote? What does Brexit
tell us about how expressions of identity have been affected by transformations of the state? An
internal conflict over what it means to be British has, in part, driven the United Kingdom to leave
the EU. Neither British Euroscepticism nor competing notions of Britishness are new. Rather,
anxiety over the ability to dictate what Britishness is, and who can be British came to a point of
crisis on June 23, 2016. My analysis demonstrates that this crisis was provoked by three points of
tension: (1) shifts of sovereignty from member states to the EU, (2) the rise of immigration, and
(3) resentment among the British working-class. Ultimately, these three issues contributed to the
victory of the New Right vision of identity and the British voters’ decision to leave the EU.
Further, I suggest that Brexit raises concerns about the consequences of exclusionary identity
politics, as national identity seems to have become a mechanism through which our globalizing
world is rejected, and familiarity and homogeneity are favored over difference.
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Preface
This project is the result of an attempt to pull together many interests: to look at
international relations, the state and the nation, exclusionary identity politics, and the movements
of people. Motivated by a desire to understand the ways in which the local and the distant, the
national and the supranational interact with one another, I ended up at June 23, 2016 and
Britain’s decision to withdraw membership from the European Union. As processes and effects
of globalization are having a profound effect on systems of governance, economic exchange, and
social interactions, there is a need to examine the transformation the state undergoes when
interacting with supranational political communities. Will supranational bodies including the
European Union continue to emerge and strengthen? Or, will independence referendums such as
Brexit become more popular? There is something that needs to be said about the compatibility of
the nation, and thus national identity, in the context of an increasingly globalized world order. If
Brexit exemplifies the rejection of a certain kind of identity — supranational, transnational,
cosmopolitan — in favor of another, British national identity, it is imperative to ask, is the world
ready to open borders and minds? Are nationalist, exclusionary politics eradicable?
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Chapter 1: The Road to Brexit
On June 23, 2016 over thiry million Britons turned out to the polls, called on to
participate in one of the most anticipated and globally significant votes in recent memory. Fortythree years after becoming a member of the European Union (EU), Britain decided it was time to
reevaluate its membership status. This was the first independence referendum ever held by a EU
member-state, and the consequences of a Brexit vote were unclear. Yet, as the country prepared
to make a statement about what it means to be British, the Brexit vote commanded the world’s
attention; as seventy-two percent of the British electorate filled out the referendum ballot, the
rest of the world stood still, anxiously awaiting David Cameron’s appearance outside Number 10
Downing Street.1 And then, all of a sudden, it happened. In a speech that lasted less than eight
minutes, former Prime Minister Cameron addressed his constituents, and the world. The people
had spoken. Britain would leave the EU.
In many ways, both nations and states across the world today are in conversation with
each other more than ever before. Political and national communities are in the throes of
complex processes of globalization, building relationships and partnerships across borders in
response. Globalization contemplates that, through a series of mechanisms, both the citizens and
economies of nations and states around the world become more closely interconnected, and will
continue to become more closely interconnected.2 This “coming together” of our world is the
direct result of trends and processes, at both the national and the international level. As a result,
new forms of economic, social and political organization have been produced and the
development of global communication, production and exchange has been encouraged.
Lord Ashcroft, “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday... and Why,” Lord Ashcroft Polls, June 24, 2016,
http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/.
2
Professor Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (SAGE, 1992); Saskia Sassen,
Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money ({New Press}, 1999),
http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/redirect?tag=citeulike09-20&path=ASIN/1565845188.
1
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One context in which issues of globalization have been explored is the EU, as it has
brought twenty-eight states together “with their respective histories, different cultures, different
languages, different political, national, regional and local interests and traditional ideologies,
different economic concepts and so forth.”3 Within a union of over two-dozen states, each with
its own way of life, there is a need to first acknowledge these stark differences and then to
construct commonalities. The EU has therefore simultaneously demanded and necessitated the
merger of market economies, the increased malleability of borders, the expansion of
communication networks, and the growth of migration. Over the course of its history the EU has
itself been transformed from a coalition that monitored the production of coal and steel, into an
economic, social and political union. The supranational policies and institutions that have caused
this to happen have relied on direct interaction and cooperation between national and
supranational bodies of governance and policy. The EU thus offers a useful framework through
which to analyze the relationship between identity and transformations of the state, making it an
appropriate focus of my research.
Significantly, globalization has not occurred without conflict. In fact, it introduces urgent
paradoxes, contradictions that put the local and the distant, the particular and the universal
through periods of tension. In some cases, the increasing ease with which corners of the world
interact with one another results in the universalization of values and opinions regarding public
policy; while in many other cases, the perceived erosion of an imagined national homogeneity
catalyzes expressions of xenophobic paranoia: a fear of the other that has contributed to
exclusionary identity politics. In this sense, globalization has implicated expressions and
understandings of identity. As will be elaborated, this project examines these implications in an
Michał Krzyżanowski and Ruth Wodak, “Political Strategies and Language Policies: The European Union Lisbon
Strategy and Its Implications for the EU’s Language and Multilingualism Policy,” Language Policy 10, no. 2 (May
2011): 115–36, doi:10.1007/s10993-011-9196-5.
3
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effort to clarify how identity manifests in moments of perceived crisis. Although the term
identity is used widely and can apply to many different situations, in this context it is used to
describe a sense of belonging to a national community — one which has been affected by
transformations of the state.
The Brexit vote represents one of such paradox of globalization, reflecting the effects of
tensions between competing forms of identity. It demonstrates a reaction against phenomena
such as transnationalism and cosmopolitanism — both of which have been perceived as threats
to what it means to be British. Building on literature on transformations of the state in the context
of globalization, I connect “state” with a set of exclusionary identity politics. The Brexit vote
emphasizes how national identity can become a mechanism through which our globalizing world
is rejected, allowing familiarity and homogeneity to be favored over difference.
This project asks: What role did identity play in the Brexit vote? What does Brexit tell us
about how expressions of identity have been affected by transformations of the state? An
ascendency of New Right Britishness has, in part, driven the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the
EU. While neither British Euroscepticism nor competing notions of British national identity are
new, recent transformations of the state have triggered latent New Right identity characteristics.
My analysis demonstrates that the transformations that contributed to this rise of New Right
Britishness include: (1) shifts of sovereignty from member states to the EU, (2) the rise of
immigration, and (3) anti-elitist sentiments among the working-class. Importantly, it was the
combination and persistence of these three issues that allowed the New Right vision to rise.
Consequently, New Right anxiety over the ability to dictate what British national identity is and
who can be British came to a point of crisis on June 23, 2016. My discussion of Brexit can
therefore be understood as a case study of what can happen when New Right identities prevail.

9

Significance
This project contributes to the growing body of literature on transformations of the state
in the context of globalization. In the 1990s, this literature was characterized by a debate over the
potential erasure of the state. While some pointed to the diminishing feasibility of the state as the
globalized world’s primary unit of governance, others believed that the state would continue to
be the primary embodiment of sovereignty.4 The academic conversation has since moved beyond
this debate. Scholars today have reframed this discussion, focusing on how the interaction
between globalization and the state has caused the state to transform.5 Brought on by the
development of supranational institutions of governance and the merger of market economies,
these transformations have redefined state sovereignty and altered notions of national identity.6

J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 559–92,
doi:10.2307/2009684; Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization,”
World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 62–87; Jurgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State and the Pressures of
Globalization,” New Left Review, no. 235 (May 1999): 46; Suzanne Berger, “Globalization and Politics,” Annual
Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (June 2000): 43–62, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.43; Martin Wolf, “Will the
Nation-State Survive Globalization?,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (2001): 178, doi:10.2307/20050051; Barry
Eichengreen and David Leblang, “Democracy and Globalization,” Economics & Politics 20, no. 3 (November
2008): 289–334, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00329.x.
5
Linda Weiss, “Globalization and National Governance: Antinomy or Interdependence?,” Review of International
Studies 25, no. 5 (December 1999): 59–88, doi:10.1017/S0260210599000595; Arthur A. Stein, “The Great
Trilemma: Are Globalization, Democracy, and Sovereignty Compatible?,” International Theory 8, no. 2 (July
2016): 297–340, doi:10.1017/S1752971916000063.
6
Habermas, “The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization”; Stephen Castles, “Migration and
Community Formation under Conditions of Globalization,” The International Migration Review 36, no. 4 (2002):
1143–68; Sheila Croucher, Globalization and Belonging: The Politics of Identity in a Changing World (Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Roland Axtmann, “The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and Its
Contemporary Transformation,” International Political Science Review 25, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): 259–79,
doi:10.1177/0192512104043016; Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul, “Citizenship and
Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State,” Annual Review of Sociology 34,
no. 1 (2008): 153–79, doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608; Professor of Transnational Anthropology Steven
Vertovec and Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism (Routledge, 2009); Christina Higgins, Identity Formation in
Globalizing Contexts: Language Learning in the New Millennium (Walter de Gruyter, 2011); Theresa Kuhn,
“Individual Transnationalism, Globalisation and Euroscepticism: An Empirical Test of Deutsch’s Transactionalist
Theory: Individual Transnationalism, Globalisation and Euroscepticism,” European Journal of Political Research
50, no. 6 (October 2011): 811–37, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01987.x; Gal Ariely, “Globalisation and the
Decline of National Identity? An Exploration across Sixty-Three Countries: Globalisation and the Decline of
National Identity,” Nations and Nationalism 18, no. 3 (July 2012): 461–82, doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00532.x;
Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson, and Simon Bromley, Globalization in Question (John Wiley & Sons, 2015); Wu
Zhicheng, “The Influence of Global Governance upon State Governance,” Social Sciences in China 37, no. 4
(October 2016): 164–74, doi:10.1080/02529203.2016.1241501.
4
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In this manner, relevant literature outlines a scholarly project rooted in efforts to understand how
these transformations have manifested as well as what their broader consequences are.
The significance of this project is its ability to use Brexit as a way to examine
consequences of transformations of the state today. My analysis builds on the emerging body of
literature on Brexit. Scholarship has begun to comment on the role of migration and a history of
British Euroscepticism in the independence referendum.7 Academics including Freeden (2017)
and Ford and Goodwin (2017) have also connected the Brexit vote to issues of identity and
political ideology. I am invested in understanding the intersection between issues of national
identity and Euroscepticism, as well as sovereignty, migration and the economy. In this manner,
this project expands and combines the thinking presented in new literature, offering a unique
perspective on how effects of supranationalism caused Britain to insulate itself, promising to
“take back control” from Eastern Europeans migrants and Muslim refugees, and from
cosmopolitan elites and an overbearing European Council.
Method
In order to answer my research questions, I begin with a discussion of British
Euroscepticism and how competing notions of British national identity have reacted to the ways
the EU has both challenged and transformed the sovereignty of its member states. More
specifically, I consider why membership to the EU was perceived as a threat to what it means to
be British. Subsequently, I examine the role of national identity in relation to three of the most
salient issues debated by the Leave and Remain campaigns — sovereignty, immigration and the
economy. In order to make the claim that these three issues contributed to the ascendency of
Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, “A Nation Divided,” Journal of Democracy; Baltimore 28, no. 1 (January
2017): 17–30; Michael Freeden, “After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,” Journal of
Political Ideologies; Abingdon 22, no. 1 (February 2017): 1–11,
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.macalester.edu/10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813.
7
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New Right Britishness, I draw on available qualitative data from opinion polls, newspaper
articles and campaign speeches. By focusing my research on the role of identity in the context of
Brexit I am able to provide a more detailed and comprehensive analysis, with the potential to
build on relevant theory about how supranationalism has caused transformations of state
sovereignty and national identity. It is important to acknowledge, however, that limiting the
number of cases considered makes it more likely that a case may be atypical. What the role of
identity in the Brexit vote tells us about how expressions of identity have reacted to
transformations of the state may only apply to Britain and British identity. That said, this
analysis aims to build on existing theory, not test it. It offers a contemporary moment in time that
can be used to elaborate on literature on the role of identity in the context of the growing
supranational regime.
Brexit
On Thursday June 23, 2016, Britain voted to withdraw membership from the European
Union.8 This vote, famously labeled Brexit, was decided by a fifty-two to forty-eight percent
margin, with over thirty million Britons turning out to vote.9 On a practical level, the vote took
place because Prime Minister Cameron promised it would. When Cameron promised an In/Out
vote he assumed that the pro-EU Liberal Democrats, his coalition partners in governing Britain
since Labour lost office in 2010, would still be around to veto the referendum.10 After the May
2015 general elections, however, Cameron only had a small overall majority. Instead of stalling
until 2017, Cameron recognized that the political climate was moving against him. Issues

Brian Wheeler and Alex Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU,” BBC News,
October 2, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.
9
Ibid.
10
White, “What Is Brexit and Why Does It Matter? The EU Referendum Guide for Americans.”
8
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surrounding migration and the economy were said to have plagued state sovereignty, calling
British national identity and autonomy into question.
In the months leading up to the Brexit vote, fierce debates were brought to the forefront
of domestic politics. Both the Leave and Remain campaigns fought to persuade voters as they
were asked: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the
European Union?” The two campaigns each presented their views on a wide range of issues,
including immigration, state sovereignty, the economy, crime, trade and jobs. Campaign efforts
targeted a large population as adult citizens of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland
were all able to vote, along with Irish citizens who live in the country, citizens from the
Commonwealth countries who reside in the UK, and UK nationals who have lived outside the
country for less than fifteen years. By the end of several contentious months, Leave secured the
majority vote.
As evidenced by Table 1, the Leave campaign was able to capture the majority of the
vote in England and Wales. Remain, however, persevered in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Overall, support for Brexit was most substantial in England. Considering the breakdown of the
Brexit vote more closely, it is clear that turnout was generally higher in pro-leave areas.11
Interestingly, public support for Leave closely mapped support for the United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP), as Euroscepticism appears to have spread across the country.
Overall, Leave enjoyed support in areas that tended to be more economically disadvantaged than
average, where average levels of education are low and the population is majority white.12
Likewise, Leave polled well among older voters, and those with less stable employment. 13

Matthew J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-Level
Analysis of the Result,” The Political Quarterly 87, no. 3 (July 1, 2016): 323–32, doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12285. 1.
12
Ibid. 4.
13
Lord Ashcroft, “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday... and Why.”
11
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Focusing more heavily on issues of immigration in the final weeks of its campaign, Leave
received its strongest support in the West Midlands (59.3 percent), a typically Eurosceptic, and
anti-immigrant region.14
On the other side, Remain received its strongest support in Gibralter (95.9 percent). “Of
the 50 local authorities where the remain vote was strongest, 39 were in London or Scotland.”15
Although, at seventy-two percent, the overall turnout for the Brexit vote was the highest it has
been since the 1992 general election, turnout was not even across the country. For example,
despite the Remain campaign’s targeting of urban, more densely populated areas, turnout in
these places tended to fall below the national average.16
Table 1: Geographical Breakdown of Brexit Vote17
Country
Leave (percentage of vote)
England
53.4%

Remain (percentage of vote)
46.6%

Wales

52.5%

47.5%

Scotland

38%

62%

Northern Ireland

44.2%

55.8%

Of additional importance is both the age and rural/urban divide. Significantly, the
younger the voter, the more likely they were to vote Remain. In fact, seventy-three percent of
eighteen to twenty four year olds voted this way.18 Older voters, however, were overwhelmingly
in support of the Leave campaign, with approximately sixty percent voicing their opposition
towards the EU. This difference in opinion among age groups has been, in part, connected to a
difference in perception about what the EU offers. For younger British citizens, the EU is a
Goodwin and Heath, “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind.”
Ibid.
16
For a more detailed account of the specific cities in which the Leave and Remain campaigns enjoyed the greatest
success, and correlating statistics, please see: Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Jon Kelly, “Brexit: How Much of a Generation Gap Is There?,” BBC News, June 24, 2016, sec. Magazine,
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36619342.
14
15
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“world of opportunity,” a space in which travel, work and new opportunities are unrestricted.19
British pensioners, however, remain much more skeptical about the potential influences the EU
may have on Britain and the towns in which they have resided their whole lives. Interestingly,
this disagreement can also be seen in the geographical divide of the Brexit vote. Urban areas,
including London, Manchester and Brighton adamantly backed Remain. The majority of rural
communities, however, tended to vote the other way.
The results of the Brexit vote have caused tensions at the subnational level. In Scotland
particularly there has been significant outcry.20 In fact, Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s First
Minister, has said that a second independence referendum in the next two-and-one-half years is
highly likely.21 In Ireland, things are slightly more complicated. While nationalists want the UK
to remain in the EU, unionists generally want to leave.22 Additionally, a Brexit will complicate
border issues for Ireland, as EU nationals would no longer enjoy the right to move freely
between the Republic of Ireland and the UK. Consequently, this may strain North-South
relations. “Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness said the impact in Northern Ireland would
be ‘very profound’ and that the whole island of Ireland should now be able to vote on
reunification.
As outlined in Table 2, the arguments made by the Leave and Remain campaigns touched
on economic, social, political, and judicial issues. Generally, the Leave campaign advocated for a
return to complete British sovereignty, while Remain attempted to highlight the advantages, in
terms of both domestic and foreign affairs, of continued EU membership. Additionally, Remain
“How Britain’s Old Forced the Young to Leave the E.U.,” Time, accessed March 2, 2017,
http://time.com/4381878/brexit-generation-gap-older-younger-voters/.
20
Peter Foster; Emily Allen, “How Would Brexit Affect Northern Ireland and Scotland?,” The Telegraph, 11:02,
sec. 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/09/how-would-brexit-affect-northern-ireland-and-scotland/. ;
Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU.”
21
Allen, “How Would Brexit Affect Northern Ireland and Scotland?” ; Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to
Know about the UK Leaving the EU.”
22
Allen, “How Would Brexit Affect Northern Ireland and Scotland?”
19
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stressed the ways in which the supranational EU institutions support, and do not hinder British
national interests.
Table 2: Main arguments presented by Leave and Remain Campaigns on Key Issues23
Issue

Leave

Immigration Freedom of movement protected by the EU
inhibits Britain’s ability to control immigration

Crime

The European Arrest Warrant allows British
citizens to be sent abroad and charged for
offenses, often mirror ones

Trade

Britain’s links with the EU are hold back its
focuses on emerging markets, namely China
and India
Too many of Britain’s laws are made overseas
by dictates passed down from Brussels. UK
Courts must become sovereign again

Law

Jobs

Clout

Finance

Sovereignty

Defense

The danger posed to jobs if the UK leaves the
EU has been exaggerated. By incentivizing
investment through low corporation tax, Britain
can flourish like the Scandinavian countries
outside the EU have
Britain does not need the EU to prosper
internationally

Remain
Leaving will not solve the migration
crisis but rather bring it to Britain’s
doorstep because border control will
move from Calais, France to Dover
Exit would stop justice being done
through the European Arrest Warrant,
which holds rapists, murderers and other
serious criminals accountable
44 percent of Britain’s exports go to
other EU countries
The exit campaign has over-exaggerated
how many laws are determined by the
European Commission. It is better to be
a part of the process that shapes EUwide laws
Around three million jobs are linked to
the EU and will be plunged into
uncertainty if Britain leaves

In a globalizing world the UK’s
interests are best protected by remaining
part of the EU block
Capital flight is nonsense, London will remain
Banks would leave the UK and the City
a leading financial center
of London because of the trading
advantages of being inside the EU
The British Parliament is no longer sovereign
In a globalized world, every country
and the EU is determined on creating an even
must work together if they want to
closer union
prosper economically
Britain may soon be asked to contribute to a EU European countries are facing threats
Army, this would erode the UK’s independent
from ISIS and a resurgent Russia.
military force
Working together is the best way to
combat these challenges

Ben Riley-Smith, “Leave or Remain in the EU? The Arguments for and against Brexit,” The Telegraph, June 20,
2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/leave-or-remain-in-the-eu-the-arguments-for-and-againstbrexit/. ; John Cassidy, “The Economic Arguments Against Brexit,” The New Yorker, May 23, 2016,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-economic-arguments-against-brexit. ; Larry Elliott Economics
editor, “The Progressive Argument for Leaving the EU Is Not Being Heard,” The Guardian, June 19, 2016, sec.
Business, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/19/progressive-argument-for-leaving-eu-is-not-beingheard-referendum-brexit.
23
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On March 29, 2016, Britain triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, officially initiating
the withdrawal process. While no other member state has ever invoked Article 50, Britain now
has two years to negotiate with the EU terms of exit. This two-year time frame can only be
extended by unanimous agreement by EU member states. Britain’s formal exit is therefore likely
to occur on March 29, 2019.24 The activation of Article 50 was initially delayed by an attempt to
give Members of Parliament (MPs) a stronger voice in the withdrawal process.25 Many believed
this is was necessary because “it has been estimated that while 421 of the 574 constituencies in
England and Wales voted to leave the EU, only 148 MPs in England and Wales voted the same
way.”26 Although May’s government rejected such calls saying that its mandate comes from the
referendum results, on November 3, 2016, Britain’s High Court ruled that Parliament must give
approval before exit processes begin.27 The UK Supreme Court affirmed this ruling. Despite the
additional vote, Parliament affirmed the referendum results.
The nature of the Brexit is dependent on the outcome of negotiations between Britain and
the EU. At the moment, there appear to be two plausible outcomes.
At one extreme, a ‘hard’ Brexit could involve the UK refusing to compromise on issues
like the free movement of people in order to maintain access to the EU single market. At
the other end of the scale, a ‘soft’ Brexit might follow a similar path to Norway, which is
a member of the single market and has to accept the free movement of people as a
result.28
That said, May has taken a bold stance going into negotiations, making it clear that she is willing
to leave the Single Market in order to regain control over immigration and sovereignty in various

Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU.”
“Brexit Britain: What Has Actually Happened so Far?,” BBC News, October 27, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36956418.
26
Goodwin and Heath, “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind.” 3.
27
Stephen Castle and Steven Erlanger, “‘Brexit’ Will Require a Vote in Parliament, U.K. Court Rules,” The New
York Times, November 3, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/world/europe/uk-brexit-voteparliament.html?_r=0.
28
Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU.”
24
25
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policy areas.29 The British government has yet to announce a firm position about how the status
of EU citizens living within the UK will be affected. In part, this is contingent on trade deals
established through the negotiations and if Britons working and residing in other EU countries
will now have to apply for visas.30
Importantly, “with nationalism and anti-establishment, anti-immigrant sentiment
spreading across Western Europe, the EU leadership in Brussels is anxious to avoid encouraging
others in the 28-member bloc to bolt.”31 A week before Britain formally triggered Article 50,
Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, announced, “when a country leaves the union,
there is no punishment. There is no price to pay to leave, but we must settle the accounts. No
more, no less. We will not ask the British to pay a single euro for something they have not
agreed to as a member.”32 Negotiations between Britain and the EU are therefore likely to
include lengthy discussions on Britain’s outstanding financial obligations. It is estimated that the
UK’s unpaid bill ranges from 55 to 60 billion euros. Regardless of the outcome of negotiations,
the process will be very complicated. As both the EU and Britain have made clear, no detail will
be left untouched. If no agreement is reached by March 29, 2019, and no extension has been
granted, Britain automatically leaves the EU and all existing agreements cease to apply to the
UK.33
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Chapter Overview
Chapter 2: The Literature
This chapter discusses the literature on transformations of the state, including the
academic conversation on national identity and sovereignty in the context of globalization and
the EU. National identity has transformed and reacted to the growth of the supranational regime.
Simultaneously, the roots of traditional national identity — ethnicity, culture and customs —
have been stressed, and new, alternative forms of identity have emerged. Additionally, the
emergence of supranational institutions and decision-making has changed the ways states assert
their sovereignty; they have to take into account the power and influence of supranational bodies.
Today, many states, including EU member states, must acknowledge the effects national actions
have on the wider, supranational community. Additionally, states are subject to the enforcement
of laws and regulations from “above.” Brexit is the most recent example of how expressions of
identity have been affected by transformations of the state. This literature provides the academic
building blocks necessary to understand the historical and political significance of the Brexit
vote.

Chapter 3: British Euroscepticism and National Identity
This chapter contextualizes the Brexit vote. In many ways, the result of Brexit sent
shockwaves around world, as it put the fate of economic and political systems in a state of
unprecedented precariousness. Despite the fact that the Brexit decision reflects a history both of
ambivalence towards the EU and tensions over what British national identity is — a history that
helps explain why Brexit occurred in the first place — a Brexit was still largely unexpected. This
chapter therefore considers how a deep-seated cynicism towards European integration brought
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the UK to the brink of crisis. The independence referendum becomes less of a shocking moment
in time, and, rather, the manifestation of a final point of tension in a volatile relationship.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the relationship between Britain and the EU,
including when and why Britain’s membership began. This overview transitions into a more
detailed examination of what animated British Euroscepticism from the 1950s to present day.
Subsequently, two notions of British national identity will be considered, the New Right and the
New Labour views. It will be argued that the New Right view is more consistent with
Eurosceptic, nationalist attitudes, ones that favor Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Lastly, these
two notions of Britishness will be put in conversations with subnational identities in order to
further highlight the internal competition over identity that has been taking place within the UK,
itself a multinational country.

Chapter 4: The Identity Politics of Brexit
Although this project focuses on Brexit as a single case study, my analysis tells a larger
story. Considering the Brexit vote as a moment in time when Britain declared “this is who we
are,” this project examines the role identity played in the decision to leave the EU. While neither
British Euroscepticism nor competing notions of Britishness are new, my analysis demonstrates
that the rise of New Right Britishness was, in part, provoked by three points of tension: (1) shifts
of sovereignty from member states to the EU, (2) the rise of immigration, and (3) anti-elitist
sentiments among the British working-class. This analysis draws on opinion polls, newspaper
articles and campaign speeches. In doing so it becomes evident that these three issues
contributed to the victory of the New Right vision of identity and, ultimately, the British voters’
decision to leave the EU. Additionally, this chapter outlines and theorizes how tensions
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surrounding national identity contributed to the role each of these issues played in Britain’s
decision to leave the EU.

Chapter 5: Confronting Exclusionary Identity Politics
Brexit is a consequence of the ascendancy of New Right Britishness. While it is nearly
impossible to say what a Brexit means at this point in time, it is clear that in some significant
way the British people want to “take back control” of their country. If we understand Brexit to
be, in part, a reaction to anxiety over transformations of the state and challenges to the nation,
Brexit is at the same time about restoring national homogeneity — one British people no longer
threatened by the “other.” Significantly, such anxiety is not unique to Britain. We see it in the
United States with the election of Donald Trump, and across much of Europe with the rise of far
right extremist movements. I conclude this analysis by suggesting that in order to combat both
the rise in “new right” politics and the consequences of such (Brexit), it is necessary to reimagine
traditional notions of belonging. Conceptions of membership to both the state and the nation
must reflect the globalized nature of present day.
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Chapter 2: The Literature
As supranational institutions, including the EU, have developed over the past few
decades, the academic conversation on transformations of the state has expanded.34 This relevant
body of literature speaks to the ways in which the actions of an individual state are now situated
within a larger system of regional and global governance, and under an umbrella of supranational
laws and institutions. Scholars have increasingly argued that although states continue to play a
crucial role in determining and maintaining their own legal and economic order, supranational
institutions are now able to influence state actions in unprecedented ways.35 This chapter outlines
this scholarship, focusing specifically on the section of the literature that discusses
transformations of national identity and sovereignty. Importantly, the EU plays a major role
within this conversation, despite the fact that such statutes may conflict with national legislation,
as member states are held accountable to laws and regulations enacted by the European Council.
By examining how academics have written about sovereignty and national identity this
literature review demonstrates that: (1) national identity has transformed in response to the
growth of supranational bodies. At the same time the roots of traditional national identity —
ethnicity, culture and customs — have been stressed and new, alternative forms of identity have
emerged. And, (2) that the emergence of supranational institutions has changed the ways states
assert their sovereignty; they now have to take into account the power and influence of
supranational bodies. Today, EU member states, must acknowledge the effects decisions made at
the national level have on the supranational community. The reverse holds true as well. As state
are subject to the enforcement of laws and regulations from “above,” policies passed by the EU
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effect domestic affairs. The literature on transformations of the state in the era of globalization
provides the academic building blocks necessary to analyze the issues that contributed to
ascendency of New Right Britishness. Britain itself has experienced such transformations.
2.1 Transformations of National Identity
Part I of this literature review outlines the academic conversation on how the era of
globalization has challenged national identity. The literature tells us that while some national
identities have absorbed European discourse, rebranding themselves as transnational, others have
sought to challenge the rise of supranationalism, reinforcing exclusionary criteria for
membership to a national community. These two transformations have happened both within
states and between them. In this sense, the politics of belonging has become a central aspect of
this segment of the academic conversation on transformations of the state.36 This section begins
with a conceptualization of national identity. Next, it considers ways national identity has
transformed, in general as well as within the EU.

Conceptualizing national identity
Identity is understood to be fluid and multifaceted. The characteristics by which we
define ourselves often change over time, and any given community or group may have multiple
ways of identifying themselves. That said, Parekh (2000) suggests that identity be conceptualized
as “those features and relationships that are constitutive of us and define and distinguish us as
certain kinds of persons.”37 Insofar as identity distinguishes us as certain kinds of persons, it also
exposes the ways acts of exclusion are inherent to feelings of belonging. Young (1986) suggests
that in order to establish a defined group (i.e. a national community), it is necessary to separate
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favorable and unfavorable characteristics. Identity becomes dependent on a set of criteria,
borders that distinguish those who belong from those who do not. As will be elaborated below, in
Britain, for example, the ability to speak English is a prerequisite to the New Right view of
British national identity.
Young further argues that a consequence of identity is that it can be used to suppress
heterogeneity.38 The ability to be perceived as British, to exude Britishness, is contingent upon
one’s embodiment of a specific set of traits and mentalities. Inherently, this means that deviation
from the norm, insofar as it perceived to be a threat to these traits and mentalities, is
unacceptable. This self-characterization, however, the pronouncement of the criteria necessary to
hold an identity, almost always comes about through rejection of traits one knows one is not. “I
am not X, so I must be Y.” By defining itself in relation to what it is not, identity ensures the
continuance of a homogenous “Us.” Only Y’s can and will be Y’s. Additionally, this “Us” must
be protected from the Other, from “Them” who are not “Us,” and are thus a threat to “Our”
identity. Young asserts that it is in this moment that identity opens to door to hate, fear,
intolerance and, ultimately, exclusion.39
National identity applies this description of identity to a specific space and the people
inhabiting this space; “national identity is the identity of a political community and refers to the
kind of community it is, its central values and commitments, its characteristic ways of talking
about and conducting its collective affairs, its organizing principles and so forth.”40 This echoes
Young’s thinking that a community is “a group that shares a specific heritage, a common self-
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identification, a common culture and set of norms.”41 In this sense, sharing an identity with
others entails mutual understanding and affirming of one another. Through doing so, we come to
acknowledge that we live in community with those we share an identity with; “persons identify
only with some other persons, feel in community only with those, and fear the difference others
confront them with because they identify with a different culture, history and point of view on
the world.”42 This same logic can be applied to a national community, stressing national
homogeneity and a need to maintain distance from the “other.” That said, there are many
different kinds of nations. For some, belonging is rooted in blood, while for others civic
nationalism is stressed. While nations involve the sense of belonging to a national community,
this sense of belonging can be more or less inclusive. Racism, ethnic chauvinism and class
devaluation are thus at times products of nations and nationalism.
General Transformations of National Identity
The academic conversation on transformations of national identity in the era of
globalization was initially characterized by a debate. Some scholars argued that globalization has
reduced the extent to which people identify with a national community. Others asserted that the
opposite had happened.43 As with the discussion on sovereignty, scholars, over the past decade,
have moved beyond this initial dispute. In many ways the nature of the relationship between
globalization and national identity depends on how you define both concepts as well as the
methods used to examine this interaction. That said, it is evident that priority given to national
identity has, to some degree, been altered.44 “The spread of transplanetary relations
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has…furthered a growth of micro-nations on a substate scale, region-nations of a suprastate
scale, and transworld national diasporas.”45 Processes and effects of globalization have in this
sense invited a pluralization of identities, expanding networks of both being and belonging.
In a study that examines how globalization relates to individuals’ feelings towards
national identity across sixty-three countries, Ariely (2012) asserts, “higher levels of
globalization are related negatively to national identity.46 In this sense, widespread dissemination
of ideas and information, as well as an open flow of goods and capital within a nation has caused
people to disregard ethnic aspects of national membership. That said, this suggests that as
national homogeneity decreases it not only becomes more difficult for a single form of national
identity to remain dominant, but the population of this nation may believe it less important that it
does so. The value placed on national identity by individuals therefore appears to be open for
debate.
Transformations Within the EU
This academic conversation includes a debate on the relationship between a supranational
European identity and senses of belonging on the national level. The focus of this literature has
been on “the extent to which top-down attempts to socialize EU citizens have succeeded in
creating an EU identity,” and, subsequently, on “the competition between national and EU
identities.”47 The viewpoints presented by academics are divided into two principal arguments:
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(1) “the impact of the EU on national identity [is] a threat” and (2) the impact of the a European
identity “reinforce[s] national identities.”48
Supranational identity endangers national identity as it challenges the monopoly the
nation holds over the concept of identity. This serves as the first critical point of tension between
national and supranational identity. In part, this is because “while national symbols are accepted
as an evident extension of national narratives, the European symbols, in comparison, tend to
appear hollow.”49 As EU member states have long, deep national histories, the EU struggles to
produce as significant symbols of collectivity. In this sense, the EU’s attempt to generate cultural
artifacts has attacked the nation’s claim to identity and senses of belonging. In short, this line of
thinking is rooted in the assertion that although the EU is an organization based on the
membership of states, European identity seeks to transcend national identity. The extent to which
this has been successful, however, is open for debate. In Britain for instance, Britons both
embrace and reject Europeanness within their own national identity. That said, due to its everexpanding geographic boundaries, lofty supranational aims and considerable political power, the
EU is competing with the state for people’s loyalty. Consequently, Harris (2011) suggests that
the role of the state has given way to the rise of European integration; “the challenges faced by
contemporary European societies — security, economy, ecology — can no longer be met by
individual states and that it is time to acknowledge the decline of the traditional nation and its
monopoly on people’s identity.”50
The other side of this debate suggests that although national identity no longer manifests
in the same way it used to, the emergence of a European identity is not necessarily a threat. Both
European and national identity have effected one another, interacting with and reacting to shifts
48
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in sovereignty from the state to EU institutions. At the national level, “national identity has
ceased to fulfill the function of social integration; the nation no longer fits into the sphere of the
state, providing the latter with an identity and cultural legitimation.”51 Notions of national
identity fall short of encompassing increasingly global perspectives and relationships. This has
created space for the emergence of a European identity, reinforcing the idea that identities and
the identities people hold on to are fluid, rather than fixed and unchanging.52 Delanty (2003)
therefore proposes that national identities are simply becoming more cosmopolitan, in a way that
supports the rise of a European supranational identity.53
Keating (2004) furthers this conversation, arguing that processes of European integration
have “provided incentives to national minority parties to rethink their ideology and policy stance,
to adapt to functional change, and to seek a place in the new European architecture.”54 In this
sense, European discourse and fragments of a European identity have become a part of
nationalist movements and identities. Keating asserts that the continuation of European
integration and thus the emergence of a European identity have had a direct effect on the nation
and national identity. This effect, however, has not necessarily been negative. Rather, aspects of
the nation, including national identity, have been rebuilt through an external projection of the
state as “part of a European family.”55 Although “at times it looks as though the state itself will
disappear…it is precisely [its] ability to externalize problems that allows it to stay together in
some form.”56 The rise of supranational identity has therefore prompted transformations of
national identity, and has not render them obsolete.
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2.2 State Sovereignty
The contemporary conversation on the relationship between globalization and the state
has moved beyond debates over whether or not globalization has undermined the state as a
political body.57 It is now apparent that juxtaposing globalization and the state is problematic.
Doing so perpetuates a “presumption of zero-sum logic, [which has] led many commentators to
mis-identify globalization as the major source of policy constraints, to overstate its
‘transformative’ (read ‘weakening’) impact, and to minimize its diverse outcomes.”58 This
juxtaposition establishes globalization as inherently threatening to the state, eliminating any
discussion of nuance in this relationship. Since at least 2000 academics have shifted this
conversation, emphasizing that globalization and states coexist; they interact with, and react to,
one another. As a result, the discussion on transformations of state sovereignty has been
developed.
I have organized this discussion into three categories (1) the emergence of supranational
institutions; (2) the loss of state controlled resources, and (3) shifts in value identifications that
have prompted greater global governance. These changes all highlight the extent to which
political solutions are now being sought beyond the state. States must now acknowledge the
effects national actions have on the supranational community as well as adhere to the laws and
regulations from “above.” As a member of the EU, a state may be subject to policies that are not
directly advantageous or favorable at the domestic level. EU Regulations are, for example,
legally binding and must be implemented uniformly across member states.
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Transforming State Sovereignty
Sovereignty, defined by Ruggie (1986) as “the institutionalization of public authority
within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains,” has given the state absolute authority within a
territorially defined space.59 This has ideally involved the state having complete authority over
economic, legal and political affairs. That said, the era of globalization has challenged these
traditional manifestations of state sovereignty. Although state sovereignty has never been
absolute, states have recognized it in each other. Since the mid-twentieth century this
understanding of state sovereignty has been transformed. In the post World War II period, and
with the emergence of the United Nations and other international organizations, states began to
surrender some of their sovereignty in certain areas. The ECSC, for example, transitioned into
the EEC and then the EU over the course of forty years. This transformation is symbolic of the
shift in authority awarded to international and now supranational organizations. Each change the
EU has undergone has had an affect on state sovereignty; the EEC established the Single Market,
creating one market for member states, while the EU has introduced a number of institutions that
now hold jurisdiction over issue areas traditionally controlled by the state.
For Habermas (1999), the transformation of state sovereignty has meant, “that a state can
no longer…provide its citizens with adequate protection from the external effects of decisions
taken by other actors, or from the knock-on effects of processes originating beyond its
borders.”60 Technological developments over the past several decades have, for example, made
both international travel and communication increasingly accessible. In this manner,
globalization has challenged the state’s ability to control the extent to which its population is
subject to outside influences. Given these outside influences, Habermas is principally concerned
John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” ed.
Kenneth N. Waltz, World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 261–85, doi:10.2307/2010273.
60
Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York, 199AD). 49
59

30

with how globalization has threatened the state’s ability to legitimate its sovereignty. The state is
now just one actor within the international community, one actor with sway over what happens
within its own borders.
The emergence of supranational institutions, including the European Council, is one
cause of transformations of state sovereignty. Hirst et al. (2015) argues that this shift has caused
states “to function less as all-purpose providers of governance and more as the authors and
legitimators of an international ‘quasi-polity.’”61 In this sense, states have become a player in a
larger, global system of governance; decision-making has taken on a new supranational
character. The European Parliament and European Council, responsible for finalizing EU law,
exemplify the extent to which supranational organizations simultaneously demand and depend
on state action. In this sense, globalization has both created and shaped the state’s relationship to
global regulatory entities, effectively diluting the state’s claim to absolute sovereignty.62
Much of the conversation on transformations of state sovereignty has been focused on
how globalization has undermined the state by reducing “resources under national control for
shaping economic outcomes.”63 Since 1990 the literature has discussed the extent to which
production and exchange in our globalized world has erased national borders and challenged the
state from an economic perspective.64 Neoliberal policies, for example, have posited the market
as universal, making the world dependent on one market, rather than the market simply being
one aspect of society.65 Scholars, including Ohmae (1990), Habermas (1999) and Brown (2015)
point toward worldwide flows of capital as well as more integrated markets as examples of
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changes that now cause the state to be dependent upon the international community for economic
stability. Consequently, Habermas has warned: “These factors explain why states no longer
constitute nodes endowing the worldwide network of commercial relations with the structure of
inter-state or international relations.”66
Lastly, as states have lost autonomy, “people’s value identification is no longer limited to
the boundaries of a particular country.”67 More and more, people have begun to see, understand
and empathize beyond borders. Zhicheng (2016) argues that in order for state actors to appease
increasingly “globally” oriented constituents, they must establish commonalities between their
own values and interests and the values of mankind as a whole.68 In this sense, shifts in value
identification can be linked to greater importance being placed on global governance. Global
governance is understood as the mechanism through which to foster collaboration and
cooperation among governments, with the goal of addressing issues that are beyond the ability of
states to deal with individually.69 Consequently, however, global governance inherently
introduces external influences. The state must now navigate a wide range of actors, values,
ideals, and economic and political structures.70 This can be evidenced in a number of ways,
including the establishment of the EU and its governing institutions, both comprised of
representatives from the twenty-eight different member states.
Sovereignty Today
In addition to the ways processes and effects of globalization have prompted
transformations of state sovereignty overtime, the literature also comments on what state
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sovereignty looks like today. Scholars including Stein (2016) ask, how, if at all, will it continue
to transform? Stein addresses this question by acknowledging the well-understood paradox:
“globalization entails cross-border flows and common policies whereas sovereignty implies
independent autonomous states.”71 That said, Stein asserts that although globalization affects the
ability of sovereign states to control internal policy outcomes and limits the policy instruments
available to governments, international relations remains, in part, the domain of interacting
states.72 In fact, history tells us that great powers have always engaged on an international level,
opening borders for both economic and political reasons.
Supranational institutions need individual states to claim legitimacy. The authority of the
EU remains dependent on the compliance of individual states. Likewise, states need
supranational bodies in order to solve the most pressing global issues of today; it is argued that if
“state governance that does not draw on and learn from others it will find it hard to maintain
long-term national order and social stability.”73 Although the EU is comprised of twenty-eight
individual member states, many laws and regulations are imposed from the supranational level.
The EU has complete jurisdiction over areas including commercial policy, competition rules and
monetary policy for euro countries. It shares responsibility with member states over a host of
other issues, including internal market rules; aspects of social policy; economic, social and
territorial cohesion; agriculture; the environment; energy; freedom, security and justice; aspects
of public health; and aspects of development cooperation and humanitarian aid.74
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In this manner, the ways in which sovereignty is practiced today reflects the constraints that have
been placed, not necessarily maliciously, on the autonomy of states.75
Looking forward, the literature suggests that while many states have lost the ability to act
independently, they remain pivotal institutions. This is remains especially true in relation to
establishing effective institutions of global governance. Intrastate cooperation and collaboration
is dependent on the willingness of individual states to participate and engage with each other in
the first place. Supranational bodies remain at the mercy of the state. As will be discussed, the
Brexit vote is an exemplarily example of the fragility of the current world order, and the
reluctance of some states to participate in supranational institutions and systems. As both
representative rule-of-law states and more authoritarian governments are actors in the
international system today, international relations are subject to dramatic change.76 Future
observance of the relationship between globalization and state sovereignty is thus of continued
interests to scholars.
Conclusion
The chapter outlines the academic conversation on transformations of national identity
and state sovereignty. Significantly, the literature on national identity suggests two opposing
transformations. On the one hand, as the EU has attempted to cultivate cultural symbols and
establish a supranational identity, some national identities have felt under attack. Consequently,
these identities have reacted to the rise of supranationalism in a way that has reinforced
exclusionary criteria for membership to a group. On the other hand, other national identities have
made room for the inclusion of Europeanness in a national sense of self. Part II of this literature
review tells us that state sovereignty has also transformed. The rules and conditions of
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sovereignty have changed. Supranational institutions, such as the EU, now have the ability to
regulate and influence the domestic affairs of member states. While states remain a major
regulator and their dissolutions seems highly unlikely, the constituencies that they serve and the
policy tools that they use have changed. In addition to the emergence of supranational
institutions, these changes have been caused by the loss of state controlled resources, and shifts
in value identifications that have prompted far greater global governance.
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Chapter 3: British Euroscepticism and National Identity
Internal tension over (1) what it means to be British and (2) over British Euroscepticism,
contrary to current claims about their “newness,” have existed for a considerable period of time
prior to the Brexit vote. This chapter therefore offers a discussion of both these tensions,
contextualizing the Brexit vote in a history of identity crises and Euroscepticism. Significantly,
two notions of British national identity will be considered, the New Right and the New Labour
views. It will be argued that the New Right view is more consistent with Eurosceptic, nationalist
attitudes, ones that favor Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Lastly, this chapter will examine the
New Right and the New Labour view of Britishness as they exist within subnational identities in
order to further highlight the internal competition over identity that has been taking place within
the UK, itself a multinational country.
Part two of this chapter begins with a more general discussion of the relationship between
Britain and the EU. This overview transitions into a more detailed examination of what animated
British Euroscepticism from the 1950s to present day. From Churchill to Blair to Brexit,
Britain’s history is one of notable reluctance and skepticism towards full economic, political, and
social integration into the EU. By providing a brief overview of Britain’s relationship with the
EU, the following pages trace the trajectory of this skepticism, a trajectory that ends with the
Brexit vote. Considering the ebbs and flows of British Euroscepticism helps explain why Brexit
occurred in the first place. The independence referendum becomes less of a shocking moment in
time, and, rather, the latest manifestation of a deep-seated cynicism towards European
integration.
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3.1 British National Identity
It is important to keep in mind that there is a constant shifting of identities within
communities at both the local and national level. What it means to be British is not static. It has
evolved and changed over time, and the ways in which Britons have seen themselves in relation
to Britishness has likewise evolved and changed over time. For example, British imperialism
changed British national identity. As the British state expanded geographically, British national
identity did as well, reconfiguring itself to embrace new territories. This is evidenced by British
appropriation of aspects of Indian culture. Curry, for example, is the national dish of Britain.
Significantly, Britain was considered to be at the height of its power during its colonial rule.
Therefore, the “inclusive” nature of British national identity at this time could be attributed, in
part, to Britain’s ability to dictate the terms of this inclusiveness. British state sovereignty was
unchallenged and the nation retained the authority to adopt only specific aspects of other
identities. The more Britain flexed its colonial muscles, the more being British has become
connected to being a member of a global superpower. In this sense, while the New Right and
New Labour views discussed below are not the only ways to think about British national identity
today, they are helpful in understanding the issues that led to a fifty-two, forty-eight divide
within in the country.
Competing National Identities
Today, two notions of Britishness are in tension with one another. Bhikhu Parekh,
political theorist and Labour member of the upper house of the British Parliament, has labeled
these two identities the New Right and New Labour views. These labels come from Parekh’s
belief that the New Right and New Labour views of Britishness are connected to Britain’s
Conservative and New Labour parties, respectfully. Conservative elites, including Enoch Powell
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and Margaret Thatcher, have found themselves competing with New Labour representatives,
such as Mark Leonard, to spread their preferred version of Britishness.77 Importantly, however,
other scholars and politicians have referenced similar notions of British national identity without
explicitly using Parekh’s labels. Rather, two competing forms of Britishness have been discussed
more abstractly. That said, this analysis uses Parekh’s New Right and New Labour as they
adequately acknowledges a politico-social divide that exists through Britain.
The New Right view of Britishness contains both civic and ethnic dimensions. In terms
of civic criteria, New Right Britishness stresses that British citizenship, English language
proficiency, and parliamentary sovereignty are all necessary.78 These aspects of civic identity
have been emphasized since the 1707 Act of Union — the act that brought England and Scotland
together to form the UK. The Act of Union stipulated that English customs and institutions be
favored, and that Scotland adopt English currency, weight and measuring standards, trade
regulations, duty on goods, and customs on import and exports.79 Additionally, the House of
Commons, located in London, has, since 1707, been considered “the personification of the
people of Britain; its independence is synonymous with their independence.”80 The significance
assigned to the House of Commons created a fear of devolution of traditions and power.
Consequently, today, parliamentary sovereignty remains a fundamental aspect of New Right
Britishness.
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The New Right view also stresses ethnic criteria, including a patriotic sense of loyalty to
the homeland and a strong sense of a “homogenous ‘we.’”81 This “we” includes British citizens
who speak English, respect British customs and traditions, and defend British parliamentary
sovereignty. Enoch Powell took a radical stance on these issues, stating “unless those who did
not belong were returned to their ‘proper’ countries, there would be ‘rivers of blood’ in
England.”82 Although Thatcher and other future proponents of the New Right view have not
taken such a drastic position, this conception of Britishness provides room for the fostering of
negative attitudes towards immigrants and perceived “others”; this is a part of Britishness that
contradicts and conflicts with the qualified inclusivity imperialism allowed for.
In terms of Britain’s relationship with Europe, there is disagreement among proponents
of the New Right. While Powell adamantly opposed European integration, Thatcher signed the
Single European Act. This statute essentially established the Single Market, a hallmark of the EU
today. Falling somewhere in between Thatcher and Powell, William Hague (British Conservative
politician) argued that “Blair’s project of modernizing Britain relegated Britain to part of the EU
and involved Britain giving up its rights to make its own laws, to have its own currency and to
set its own interest rates.”83 In this sense, even within the New Right notion of Britishness there
are noticeable differences in opinion. This further highlights the logic of a multiplicity of British
identities. A fierce sense of attachment to Britain as a territorially bound state only applies to
some of these identities, and then only in varying degrees. The relationship between British
national identity and the EU will be further elaborated by the discussion of British
Euroscepticism below.
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In contrast, the New Labor view offers a different idea of British national identity. While
it also includes important civic and ethnic components, it emphasizes pluralism, inclusivity, and
individualism. The rights and liberties of the individual are cherished, and New Labour focuses
on justice, multiculturalism, and a forward-looking, multi-ethnic Britain.84 New Labour
Britishness has therefore noted the importance of tolerance, cultural plurality, and hospitality;
Britishness is for everyone, and everyone should be comfortable being British. This has led to
the New Labour belief that part of Britain’s political power comes from equal partnership with
England, Scotland, Wales and, to a certain extent, Northern Ireland.85 This introduces a major
point of contention with the New Right view, as Blair argues, “it is not parliamentary sovereignty
but parliamentary democracy that is central to British identity”86 (emphases added).
To qualify this seemingly idealist identity, the New Labour view of Britishness is
exclusionary in its own right. Those who identify with its criteria tend to be Londoners, young
urban elites who have branded themselves as “cool.”87 In this sense, a degree of intolerance can
be found within the New Labour view, as it implies that “those citizens who do not display
enterprise, creativity and other desired qualities are not fully British.”88 Problematically, this
contradicts New Labour’s supposed position that Britishness is for everyone.
Subnational Identities
It is difficult to discuss the aspects or dimensions of a British national identity without
acknowledging that Britain itself is multinational. In fact, Kumar (2003) argues that British
identity did not even materialize until the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707, which formally

84

Leonard, Britain. 5.
Parekh, “Defining British National Identity.” 12.
86
Ibid. 12.
87
Ibid. 12.
88
Ibid. 13.
85

40

established the united kingdom of Great Britain.89 The signing of the Union necessitated the
bridging of differences between England and its new sister nation, Scotland. Bringing the nations
of the UK together, under one collective identity, was considered a way to increase the
prominence and status of the newly formed kingdom. How the subnational identities of the UK
have conflicted with and reinforced both the New Right and New Labour conception of
Britishness is significant. Interestingly, the age of British imperialism only further propagated a
sense of urgency to unite and unify nationals, both those within the UK and in its colonies
abroad. It was the goal of imperial Britain to establish an empire of Britons, one people to grow
and prosper and become more powerful than rival states. Since 1982, however, it has been noted
by scholars that a significant cohort of English, Welsh, Scottish, and northern Irish nationals do
not think of themselves as British.90 Consequently, the original project of colonial Britain — the
creating of a “common transnational ethnicized Britishness” — has been undermined.91 This
rejection of Britishness by inhabitants of the British Isles themselves is considered to be
problematic by both the New Right and New Labour views.
England: In many ways England and Britain have been conflated. Today, in both
journalistic and academic writing, the words “England” and “Britain,” “English and British” are
used interchangeably.92 Although up until the end of the nineteenth century, “Britishness”
trumped “Englishness,” when Britain’s colonial ventures slowed it become almost a general rule
to mark all major events and achievements of national life as English and not British.
Additionally, England began to cultivate a distinct English historiography, clarify and code the
English language, expand the “great tradition'' of English literature, and celebrate a particular
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type of landscape as quintessentially English.93 As England has done so, it has taken in Britain
and the British Empire.94
There are multiple understandings of Englishness. For older citizens living outside major
urban areas, Englishness remains attached to the renewed sense of importance and influence it
gained after “subsuming” Britain after the fall of the British Empire. For younger generations,
however, English national identity “is an alien phenomenon, invented elsewhere and thankfully
kept at bay from English shores.”95 This has resulted in a persistent denial about the very
existence of nationalism and national identity within England; “so many outsiders and
‘foreigners’ have been involved in the elaboration of it that Englishness is best considered as
something made from afar, from outside England.”96 In relation to Brexit, “in England, Leave
voters (39%) were more than twice as likely as Remain voters (18%) to describe themselves
either as “English not British” or “more English than British.” Remain voters were twice as
likely as leavers to see themselves as more British than English.”97 Here, it is possible to discern
New Labour’s idea that Britishness can and must be for everyone. This introduces an interesting
dynamic between the prioritization of subnational and national identities with Britain itself — a
dynamic that is emblematic of the tensions between national and supranational identity.
Scotland: Unable to define Scottishness through language, religion or race, there is a
fierce sense of Scottish statehood; “the lack of clear, ‘objective’ demarcators does not hinder the
strength of Scottish identity.98 This has led to the establishment of education and legal systems,
civil services, and a “common weal” of Scottish values that are not only separate from Britain’s
93
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but provided an escape from the clutches of Britain .99 It is thus unsurprising that “in Scotland,
Remain voters (55%) were more likely than Leave voters (46%) to see themselves as “Scottish
not British” or “more Scottish than British.”100
In an attempt to reconnect the Scottish with a sense of loyalty to the UK, political leaders
including Gordon Brown and David Cameron have promoted British values and forgotten
institutions within Scotland.101 The Scottish National Party (SNP), however, a nationalist and
social democratic political party in Scotland that campaigns for Scottish independence, has,
labeled such efforts as attempts to “sell” Britain to those outside of England. Consequently,
“very few Scots see themselves as primarily British, whereas nearly three-quarters consider
themselves ‘mainly’ or ‘only’ Scottish.”102 Additionally, Scotland has become increasingly open
to further European integration, offering a counterbalance to the overwhelming power of
England. Despite the fact that the 2014 Scottish independence referendum was voted down, its
occurrence makes a bold statement about how Scots see themselves in relation to Britain.
In this regard, the imperial project of Britain, one which centuries ago sought to unite England,
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, is still today unrealized. Within Wales England’s oldest colony,
“Welsh consciousness can be found in all ranks of society.”103 In this manner Britain is home to
a true multiplicity of identities; competing notions of Britishness at both the national and
subnational level have continued to undermine the establishment of one cohesive national
identity.
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3.2 Britain and the EU
The idea of a European union began with the desire to create a peaceful, united and
prosperous Europe.104 This aspiration can be traced back to the post World War II period.
Following the catastrophe of the Second World War there was a push to prevent the reoccurrence
of violence among European states. In 1951, this push resulted in France, Germany, Italy the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.
(ECSC). The ECSC sought to establish a supranational system of governance over Europe’s coal
and steel industries.105 The community’s decision to reduce direct state control over the
production of coal and steel — materials necessary for manufacturing weapons — emphasizes
Europe’s attempt to avoid a third world war.
In Post War era, Britain took notice of France and Germany’s recovering economies.106
During this regrowth period, known as the Golden Age, France and Germany were more
successful than Britain in catching up to states that were less affected financially by the war. In
part, France and Germany’s recovery was attributed to the development of effective
manufacturing markets.107 Within Britain, the economic stability of neighboring countries
increased national support, among both politicians and those suffering financially, for joining the
European Coal and Steele Community (ECSC). Britain initially voted down entry, however, as
many Britons did not see themselves as European nor see the European project as worthy of
joining. Rather, Britain saw itself more closely connected to the Commonwealth and the United
States. The UK was “content for the Europeans, among whom they did not necessarily see
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themselves, to press ahead with integration.”108 That said, by 1970 this began to change. Britain
began to acknowledge the benefits of being able to influence processes of European integration.
If the European Economic Community (EEC) was to become a more formal political union, as
former Prime Minister Edward Heath suspected, the UK wanted to voice in decision-making
processes. Britain’s final decision to join the EEC in 1973 can therefore be interpreted as a
power move, a strategic maneuver made in order to gain greater influence in the region.109
A History of Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism has been conceptualized in two distinct yet overlapping ways. Hard
Euroscepticism is “based on principled opposition to the project of European integration as
embodied in the EU; in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational
institution such as the EU.”110 Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, involves “opposition to
the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that
the EU is planning to make.”111 Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) stipulate that further extension of
competencies include: the development of supranational European institutions that would hinder
national sovereignty, an increase in the number of EU member states, an increase in EU
responsibilities, a change in the balance of authority between the EU and its member states, and a
change in EU economic and monetary policy.112 As will be clarified, Brexit exemplifies a
moment of Soft Euroscepticism insofar as Britain does not fundamentally oppose the European
integration project. Rather, it appears to object only to certain aspects of European integration,
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including the growing number and influence of EU institutions. Brexit thus represents a moment
in time where Soft Eurosceptics were able to convince a majority of the country that a continued
expansion of the EU threatened British national identity. It is important to note that scholars have
engaged with the concept of Euroscepticism extensively.113 Although academics utilize different
terminology — hard, soft, right-wing, and left-wing, and frame their discussion in various ways,
(i.e., Euroscepticism and political parties, Euroscepticism and the masses) — there is consensus
that Euroscepticism is tied to a need to protect and revitalize national identity and sovereignty.114
Although the term Euroscepticism was coined in the 1980s, Eurosceptic sentiments in
Britain can be traced back to Winston Churchill. Since the time of his leadership, British foreign
policy has prioritized English-speaking peoples and the Empire-Commonwealth over Europe.115
The European element was seen as unnecessary and constrictive to the realization of Britain’s
global destiny. Since Churchill “Europe has been constructed and perceived as a ‘choice’ for the
British who can apparently be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Europe and more often than not ‘semi-detached’
from it.”116 Through policy initiatives that pushed a pro-Britain narrative, Churchill was able to
effectively introduce Eurosceptic sentiments across Britain.
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Since Britain joined the EEC it has been labeled an “awkward partner” of Europe.117
Awkwardness in this sense is rooted in Britain’s ambivalence towards its involvement in the EU.
As will be discussed shortly, this ambivalence is evidenced by Britain’s decision neither to use
the euro nor to join the Schengen Area. EU citizens living within the Schengen Area — a block
of twenty-six countries that have abolished the passport and any other type of border control —
enjoy the privilege of unrestricted movement.118 Additionally, Britain has further demonstrated a
level of hesitation by more consistently favoring engagement with the EU in moments when
doing so appeared to advance national interests. For example, Britain has historically endorsed
majority voting on issues considered to be financially beneficial for the UK, but has opposed
such voting in other policy areas including foreign affairs and security.119 “[I]n the first case the
British leaders considered the application of the voting rule of qualified majority as beneficial to
their economy, while in the second case such a development was seen as a threat to national
sovereignty.”120 This support of majority voting in specific instances reflects Britain favoring its
own national interests. In this sense, Britain’s inclusion in an integrated Europe has arguably
been spurred by self-interest to regain the economic security it enjoyed before the World Wars.
By the mid 1970s, Euroscepticism in Britain had increased, as there was great debate
over the extent to which membership to the EEC would benefit Britain’s economy. In 1975, a
divided British Labour government held a leave referendum.121 This vote was largely driven by
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controversy over membership in the Common Market.122 While large corporations and the
consumer sector argued that access to the EEC’s market would increase revenue and job
production, sectors of the Labour Party remained adamant that it would only raise prices and
deplete Britain’s wealth. In contrast to Brexit, however, on June 5, 1975, 67.2 percent of
Britain’s eligible voter population chose to remain in the EU.123 As the ‘Yes’ vote was fairly
even across the country, intrastate tensions were kept to a minimum. Despite the majority ‘Yes’
vote the decision to remain a part of the EU was more of a statement about Britain’s continued
economic position than it was a ringing endorsement of the EEC.124 At the time, Britain was
focused on financial growth and the reestablishment of economic stability. In this sense, leaving
the EEC was perceived as dangerous. “Thus the 1975 referendum did not, as many then
imagined, settle the issue of British membership.”125 Since then, Eurosceptics in Britain have
been calling for another vote, claiming that too much power has been transferred from the British
parliament to Brussels.126
The outcome of the 1975 referendum provided the pubic upset necessary to further
reinforce the notion of Euroscepticism within Britain. While Margaret Thatcher was in office,
“the British attitude towards the EC has turned into a zero-sum game where any British
concession in the direction of further integration was seen as another loss of national
sovereignty.”127 Eurosceptics, for example, saw Thatcher’s signing of the Single European Act
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(SEA), as a threat to national sovereignty, the job market, and general domestic growth.128 The
SEA expedited the elimination of barriers to free trade among member states, effectively
establishing the Single Market. Although Thatcher signed the SEA, she was wary of a European
superstate that could subordinate Britain’s political system. Thatcher thus fought for a reduction
in Britain’s overall contributions to the EU’s budget and adamantly defended British sovereignty
within the EU context.129
As contradictory as it may sound, Thatcher was not fundamentally opposed to European
integration as a general project. Rather, she supported an integrated Europe, comprised of
independent, sovereign states, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. According to
Thatcher, member states must reserve the right to change direction if EU policy seems
detrimental to national interest. Thatcher’s model of support for the EU therefore rejected
European federalism that would damage British interest and was based on active cooperation
between autonomous member states.130 Active cooperation between autonomous member states
would allow for a “wider, freer, more flexible Europe…a wider Community in which different
countries came together for different purposes on different occasions.”131 Likewise, “[s]he
believed that European political cooperation would help reinforce Western Europe’s global
standing and would strengthen Britain’s international position.”132 Thatcher’s involvement with
the Single Market Act, however, was interpreted by Eurosceptics as a British commitment to
European integration. Although Eurosceptics were unable to lobby for an exit referendum in
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1983, this period did allow for the gathering of evidence to convince others of the duplicity of
the integration process.133
Following Thatcher’s time in office, the Conservative Party was divided between antiand pro-European proponents. Britain was ready for a peacemaker. John Major was viewed as an
ideal compromise candidate, one that would unite the Conservative Party by calming tensions
between pro- and anti-European party members, as he sought to “advance the substance of
Thatcherism but with gentler style.”134 Major’s attempts to fulfill this role were initially made
evident during his tenure as Thatcher’s Foreign Secretary. While Thatcher adamantly opposed
the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), not to mention Britain’s
involvement in it, Major favored an opt-in provision that would allow individual member states
to decide whether and when to join.135 After being appointed Prime Minister in 1990, Major took
a softer approach toward European integration. In doing so, he sought to “bury old differences in
Britain between North and South, blue-collar and white-collar, polytechnic and university.”136
Since World War II, upward class mobility in Britain has stagnated. This exaggerated “very
clear strata in [British] society, each with different levels of social, cultural and economic
capital.”137 Major attempted to ease these class tensions by continuing to advocate for opt-in
clauses, which would allow member states to consider national interests before adhering to EU
policy.
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Major’s role as compromiser, however, did not go unchallenged. During this time, Rupert
Murdoch, an Australian-American entrepreneur who enjoyed significant control over large
media companies, led the way in creating a climate of fear around European matters that severely
tested the leadership qualities of even nominally pro-European prime ministers.138 Murdoch’s
interests in impeding British relations with the EU were rooted in a desire to limit competition
and maintain a monopoly over British media. For example, he attacked Major for attempting to
forge a more perfect union with the EU. Murdoch’s complaints mirror those of Major’s critics
more generally. Former Thatcher Conservatives believed Major only supported their more
Eurosceptic views when the legislation in question was not substantial.139 He was portrayed as a
flake, defending European integration when the stakes were high, i.e., at the signing of the Treaty
of Maastricht, and making Eurosceptic noise only when perceived necessary for holding the
party together. Ultimately, Major’s failure to reunite the Conservative party led to the end of his
time in office.
In 1997, Tony Blair and his New Labour Party won the general election. In many ways,
Blair’s success during the election can be attributed to Major’s shortcomings, specifically his
inability to unite the Conservative Party. Upon appointment, Blair pushed pro-European
discourse, vocally advocating for a future across the Channel, a Britain encapsulated within
Europe.140 Interestingly, as Blair advocated for British voices to be at the heart of European
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affairs, public opinion toward membership fluctuated. “At one point there was a swing of 12% in
just three months, from a 53%-32% lead for ‘stay’ to 46%-43% in favour of Leave between June
and September 2000.”141 Given this fluctuation Blair was forced to reconsider European
integration as an electoral liability.142 The Blair government realized that continuing to publically
push a pro-Europe narrative would cause reelection issues. In this manner, while Blair still
supported pro-EU policy, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, he also attempted to depoliticize the
European question and to defer the making of conclusive decisions on contentious European
issues.143 Significantly, the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred certain powers from EU member
state governments to the European Parliament. These powers included legislating on
immigration, civil and criminal laws and foreign policy.144 His time in office thus presents an
interesting struggle faced by British politician. There is a need to balance both public support of
the pursuit of EU integration and ever present expressions of Euroscepticism.
Today, there are many explanations as to why Euroscepticism remains prevalent within
Britain. Such explanations are inextricably linked to globalization, and thus transformations of
the state. For example, “historic legacy as a world power still resonates and remains an important
explanation for the continued belief among many British citizens, including political elites, that
Britain is a separate entity and does not need to pursue a European destiny.”145 This fear of a loss
of autonomy to Brussels has reinforced anti-Europe sentiments. Likewise, it has paved the way
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for Soft Eurosceptics in Britain, as they gained support following the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty (1992), an act that solidified further development of the EU’s supranational
dimension. In fact, since 1997, Eurobarometer pollsters have found that British support for the
EU is not much more than half the EU average.146
Acknowledging this brief chronology, it is evident that Britain’s entire history with the
EU reflects a degree of hesitation and skepticism. For instance, in 1999 the Euro replaced the
currencies of eleven European countries, culminating the process of economic and monetary
union in Europe.147 The establishment of this monetary union finally realized the initial goals of
the EEC laid out in 1971. Likewise, in 2007 the Schengen Area was created, effectively
eliminating internal borders in nine of the current ten EU members state.148 As mentioned,
however, Britain never replaced the pound with the euro, and does not participate in the
Schengen Area; these decisions were made to appease a Eurosceptic public. This highlights
Britain’s resistance to EU policy that reduces British autonomy.
In providing a description of British national identity and British Euroscepticism this
chapter begs the question, why now? What changed within the UK that led to ascendancy of the
New Right version of Britishness? Keeping my discussion focused on the role of British national
identity, the following chapter addresses these questions. I examine why a Eurosceptic, yet
stable, relationship was brought to a point of crisis, as well as why New Right British identity
prevailed in the Brexit vote.
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Chapter 4: The Rise of the New Right
An ascendency of the New Right version of British national identity has driven the UK to
withdraw membership from the EU. As has been discussed, neither British Euroscepticism nor
competing notions of Britishness are new. Rather, anxiety over transformations of the state and
challenges to the nation has caused Britons to embrace New Right Britishness as opposed to the
New Labour view. This rise of the New Right can be attributed to (1) state sovereignty shifting
from the UK to the EU, (2) immigration increasing and (3) anti-elitist sentiments persisting
among the British working-class. The combination of these three issues, and the extent to which
they polarized notions of British national identity, allowed New Right attitudes to prevail in an
unprecedented way; the Brexit vote demonstrates that a majority of Britain identifies, at least
partially, with New Right Britishness. My analysis focuses on these three issues because they
were prominent throughout the Brexit campaign, suggesting that they were exceptionally
important in the minds of voters. My discussion of the Brexit vote itself therefore becomes a case
study of reactionary politics – a consequence of what can happen when New Right identities
prevail.

4.1 Analyzing the Issues in the Brexit Campaign
Sovereignty
The first campaign issue that can be connected to a rise of New Right Britishness is
sovereignty. The desire to reclaim a certain level of power and influence on the world stage
therefore served as subtext for the Brexit referendum. In this sense, Brexit offered New Right
proponents an opportunity to declare: “the UK is not Europe,” it is its own autonomous and
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powerful entity, detached from “the economic crises and hotbeds of extremism.”149 Nigel Farage,
the former leader of UKIP, a political party whose views mirror New Right understandings of
British national identity, advocated for Britain to reestablish itself as “a proud, patriotic country
that has control of its borders, represents itself on the world stage and makes its own laws in our
own sovereign Parliament.”150 Likewise, the Leave campaign itself argued that by withdrawing
membership “we regain our seats on international institutions like the World Trade Organisation
so we are a more influential force for free trade and international cooperation.”151 Continuing to
be a member of the EU would thus further challenged British sovereignty and sense of self.
Given the rhetoric of UKIP politicians and the Leave campaign, Britons who hope to restore
traditional notions of sovereignty and pursue national projects away from the laws and policies
enforced by the EU — laws and policies some Britons believe have undermined the country’s
global status — have embraced New Right attitudes.
Strands of British national identity, including the New Right, has been both threatened
and reinforced by perceived threats to the country’s status on the world stage. Over the past
decade “the identities which arose from Union and Empire which underpinned the idea of
Britishness for more than three centuries have been called into question by devolution, by
decolonization, by immigration, and by European integration.”152 As British sovereignty has had
to adapt to the influences of supranational governance, the ability of Britain to act in an
autonomous and hegemonic manner has diminished. In this sense, a decline of global power has
caused a crisis of British identity. This highlights the importance of the role of identity in relation
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to issues surrounding a fear of a loss of state sovereignty and power within the international
community. The strengthening of EU sovereignty is demonstrated by its ability to dictate the
ingredients of chocolate to establish human rights standards. While the infamous thirty year
Chocolate War may seems trivial, it highlights the extent to which EU institutions now have the
authority to enforce interstate trade. Additionally, in the case of human rights, the European
Commission ensures that judgments made by the Court of Justice are recognized in every
member state. This has shaped a framework of human rights standards that member states are
held accountable to.
Additionally, for those who adhere to the New Right view, “national sovereignty is
important because the Conservatives, too, want Britain to be one of the most admired and
influential countries in the world.”153 The rise of subnational identities has, therefore, threatened
what it means to be British. Increasing the power or autonomy of Scotland, Wales or England at
the expense of Britain as a united polity is therefore dangerous. In this vein, William Hague,
British Conservative politician and proponent of the New Right view, argues that battles over
parliament sovereignty represent one point of conflict between the national and subnational
identity in the UK. He asserts: “the British people I talked to on my campaign…are uneasy at the
current political assault on our institutions, liberties and traditions; and they are alarmed at the
rising tide of nationalism in Scotland, Wales and England.”154
As generations of Britons grew up citizens of a major world power, a perceived loss of
state autonomy increased anxiety over losing hold of what it means to be British. In fact, nearly
half (forty-nine percent) of Leave voters said the single biggest reason for wanting to leave the
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EU was “the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK.”155 Significantly,
during the height of the British Empire, for example, the country was perceived to be at its best
and it ruled half the world. British influences were widespread and the ambition of establishing a
united kingdom was being fulfilled. As one Leave voter commented, “from one canal to another,
from the Suez crisis of 1956 through to the Panama Papers 60 years later, the stories of our lives
in Britain have largely been a story of just how hard some of us find it to adjust to no longer
being top dog.”156 Being British involved being a member of a country that was taken seriously.
Today, however, Britain must adhere to laws and regulations passed down from Brussels.
Although many Britons no longer have experience with the British Empire, for generations
colonial narratives ran deep. This tradition of national power seems to have reached the eldest
generations alive today, as older citizens who overwhelmingly voted “leave.”
Given a national nostalgia for the independence, power and sovereignty Britain enjoyed
during its imperial days, the Brexit vote provided an opportunity for proponents of the New
Right view to restore what they believe it means to be British. As discussed above, to be British
is to belong to a truly global power, one that enjoys absolute parliamentary sovereignty. As
membership to the EU has been perceived to undermine such autonomy, Britons have expressed
the inability to “recognize our country” and, consequently, to find meaning in the country’s
national identity.157 While Britain’s position at the top of the global order may have been lost, the
ascendency of the New Right suggests a deep desire for it to be regained, as the very essence of
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Britishness hangs in the balance. Brexit thus became an opportunity for the New Right to attempt
to reassert its understanding of British national identity.
Immigration
Increased and diversified immigration into Britain has contributed to the rise of New
Right Britishness. In order to support this claim this section (1) examines recent increases in
immigration to both the EU and UK, (2) briefly considers who, historically, has been both
included and excluded from British national identity and (3) analyzes opinion polls and argument
made the Leave campaign regarding immigration.
Today, Europe is an immigrant continent; that is, there are more people coming in than
leaving. In 2014, 1.6 million citizens of non-member countries immigrated into the EU and 1.3
million people with citizenship in one EU member state moved to another.158 By January 2015,
there were 34.4 million people born outside of the EU member states living within them, while
18.5 million people had moved from EU state of birth to another.159 As evidenced in Table 3, the
number of asylum applications from fifteen countries has more than tripled since 2013. These
numbers indicate that there has been a growth of migration into Europe, and EU member states
more specifically, over the last several years. Between January 2015 and March 2016, Europe
received approximately 1.5 million asylum applications.160 2015 therefore marked the largest
annual flow of refugees into Europe since 1985, comparable only to the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989 and the subsequent influx of refugees from East to West.
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Table 3: Number of Refugees to Europe 2013-2015161
Citizenship
2013
2014

2015

Syria

49,000

125,000

378,000

Afghanistan

23,000

39,000

193,000

Iraq

9,000

15,000

127,000

Kosovo

18,000

35,000

68,000

Albania

11,000

16,000

67,000

Pakistan

19,000

21,000

47,000

Eritrea

20,000

46,000

46,000

Nigeria

12,000

20,000

31,000

Iran

11,000

10,000

27,000

Somalia

18,000

16,000

21,000

Ukraine

1,000

14,000

21,100

Serbia

15,000

20,000

19,000

Russia

36,000

14,000

19,000

Bangladesh

7,000

10,000

18,000

Gambia

4,000

12,000

13,000

Other

151,000

182,000

230,000

TOTAL

405,000

596,000

1,325,000

As the number of people entering the EU has grown, the demographics of those arriving
have become increasingly diverse. For example, Table 3 also shows that since 2013, Syria,
Afghanistan and Iraq have become the top three countries contributing to those seeking asylum
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in Europe. This represents a change in demographics, as previously the majority of asylum
seekers came from Eastern European countries such as Kosovo and Albania. Across the board,
migrants, immigrants and asylum seekers are predominantly young males (seventy-three percent)
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four.162
The reasons people migrate to Europe are extensive. Typically they are simultaneously
pushed and pulled by a combination of economic, political and social factors. That said, the
conflict in Syria remains the biggest driver of migration today. While ongoing violence in
Afghanistan and Iraq, abuses in Eritrea and poverty in Kosovo have contributed to migration,
Syrians have accounted for almost thirty percent of asylum applications. As will be discussed, as
migration into the EU has become more diverse, including significantly more Middle Eastern
nationals, the New Right has claimed that the “homogenous we” of British national identity has
been threatened.
Like the EU, immigration to the UK has been more extensive and more diverse in the
21st Century than ever before. In 2004 the EU expanded to include ten new countries. These
countries were dubbed the A8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia); the other two countries are Malta and Cyprus.163 Between May 2004 and
May 2009, 1.3 million people migrated from A8 countries to Britain. “In the UK, A8 citizens
were able to freely and legally take up employment from May 2004 as long as they registered
with the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS).”164 Britain thus saw a great increase in the number
of eastern European migrants crossing its borders. Presently, the Poles make up Britain’s largest
foreign national group.

162

Ibid.
“EU Migration to and from the UK,” Migration Observatory, October 31, 2016,
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/eu-migration-to-and-from-the-uk/.
164
“EU Migration to and from the UK.”
163

60

The introduction of the A8 was not the first time the UK had experienced increasing and
diverse immigration. Between the end of World War II and the turn of the century,
approximately three million people from Africa, the Pacific Rim, the Caribbean and the Indian
Subcontinent.165 This influx of migrants began after World War II because faced a labor shortage
during the Post War era. Needing workers to revitalize its economy, Britain extended an
invitation to hundreds of laborers. Although the country sought to attract white Europeans, large
groups of Caribbean descent migrated to the UK. Additionally, until 1968, Britain had a policy
of welcoming Commonwealth immigrants.166 This open-door policy had allowed people from
the Commonwealth countries, including India, Pakistan, Australia, Nigeria and many Caribbean
Islands, to migrate to Britain. In 1968, however, the British Parliament “deprived UK citizens of
Asian origin of the right to enter and live in the country whose citizens they were and remain.”167
This was seen as a racial measure, a response to increased anxiety among white Britons that New
Right ethnic conditions of Britishness were being challenged.
By 2015, inflows of EU nationals migrating to the UK stood at 269,000, up from 264,000
in 2014.168 Net migration of EU citizens was estimated at 184,000 in 2015, an increase from
174,000 in 2014.”169 Likewise, in 2015 non-EU citizens accounted for forty-four percent of all
inflows to the UK.170 Despite Conservative efforts, the number of people coming to live and
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work in the UK from the rest of the world not only exceeds those from the EU but it has also
increased.
The fear that surrounds migration to Britain today is not new. It has a deep-seated history
in the country, reignited over the years by periodic increases in the number of migrants arriving.
Looking back to 1945, the perceived fear has been caused by the “implication that something
culturally British was being injured, probably fatally.”171 For generations, white Britons have
tested migrants, looking for ways to force them to prove their loyalty to Britain. “In the First
World War, Jewish men were under severe pressure to join the army to ‘prove’ that they were
Britons first and Jews second.”172 Additionally, proponents of exclusionary notions of British
national identity have supported English-language proficiency tests and proof of knowledge of
British history. These tests were the result of a national myth established after World War II, a
myth that used British resilience during the war to foster a sense of national community. A
snapshot was taken of 1945 Britain, the Britain that was a member of the victorious Allied
Forces. It is the members of this Britain who were at the time and are today welcome and
included in understandings of British national identity.
World War II “is taken to evoke the British at their best, the qualities of Churchill’s
‘island race’… It helps construct a sense of nation and nationality that excludes the bulk of post1945 immigrants.”173 Thus, when Black and Asian migrants began arriving in higher numbers in
the 1950s and 1960s, Britain had already formed a sense of national identity, one that did not
include these newcomers. During this time Enoch Powell was well supported in the late 1960s as
he “saw black immigration as destructive of the very existence of Britain.”174 Powell argued that
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Britain “must be mad…to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are
for the most part the material of the future growth of immigrant-descended population.”175 This
implies that not only were immigrants viewed negatively, but their children and descendants
were as well.
As more people entered Britain since World War II and the EEC transitioned into the EU
in 1993, public anxiety over immigration rose.176 Beginning in the late 1990s, monthly polling
data from the IpsosMORI agency showed that people identified immigration as one of the top
three most important issues facing the UK; in 2016, it was the issue picked most often by survey
respondents.177 In this sense, opposition to immigration within Britain is a very salient issue. In a
public opinion poll from April 2016, seventy-six percent of respondents wanted immigration
reduced in general, and seventy-two percent thought that the government was right to impose
numerical limit on it.178 Likewise, while fifty-two percent said that the government should try to
reduce immigration by “a lot,” eighty-one percent thought that the government should limit
benefits to migrants resident in UK for less than two years.179 Evidently, voters want the country
to control immigration.
As both Muslim refugees and European economic migrants have continued to arrive in
the country, their presence has been labeled a threat to national security and economic stability.
Significantly, British voters began to identify immigration and border control as among the most
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important issues facing the country.180 In a statement given by Boris Johnson, Britain’s current
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the politician argued,

People have every right to question why we can't control our borders. We need to answer
those concerns by taking back control of those borders. But we must also face the fact
that the system has spun out of control. We cannot control the numbers. We cannot
control the terms on which people come and how we remove those who abuse our
hospitality.181
In this sense, the idea that Brexit was solely about sovereignty and not also xenophobia is a
misleading claim. Issues surrounding sovereignty are intrinsically connected to a fear of “others”
infiltrating state borders. This suggests that a New Right understanding of immigration, one that
portrays immigrants as a formidable challenge to national identity has spread throughout the UK.
Migration has triggered exclusionary expressions of British identity — aspects of British identity
that can be linked to the New Right tradition and the belief that heterogeneity and diversity are
challenges to the national community. Immigration has thus become a scapegoat for the dilution
of Britishness.
In response to this perception that tising migration has changed the demographics of
Britain, threatening the homogenous “we” that is critical to the country’s national identity.
According to numerous polls and researchers, the majority of Britain wants to see a reduction in
immigration. This statistic included fifty-five percent of Remain voters. The general public’s
desire for reduced migration can be connected to fears surrounding potential threats to British
identity. For example, ninety-five percent of respondents to an April 2016 opinion poll indicated
that that it was very important or fairly important for migrants to speak English in order to
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become “truly British.”182 Additionally, this same poll illustrates that one of the most important
requirements for living in Britain includes a respect for British culture and customs.183 In this
context, British culture and customs involves the English language, Christian religious life and
the English parliamentary system.
A recent increase in support for UKIP further highlights the extent to which the British
public has been displeased by contemporary migration trends. UKIP, founded on an anti-EU
platform in 1993, received a majority of UK seats in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections.
As these elections take place once every five years, UKIP will enjoy significant representation at
the EU level through the Brexit negotiation process. Significantly, “70 percent of UKIP
supporters identify immigration as the most important issue facing the UK, compared to 45
percent of Conservative voters and just above 25 percent of Labour voters.”184 In part, emphasis
on immigration concerns has been prompted by general questions regarding security. Following
the Paris and Brussels attacks of 2015, for example, Leave proponents argued that withdrawing
membership from the EU would allow Britain to increase border security and ultimately reduce
terrorist threats.185 Thus, as British membership to the EU protects freedom of movement for EU
citizens, UKIP has adamantly supported the Brexit vote.
A key outcome of Brexit would be to give Parliament back control of British borders. In
this manner, the government has expressed its unwillingness to compromise with the EU on
matters pertaining to immigration. Theresa May has even explicitly stated: “We will have control
of our borders, control of our laws.”186 Returning to the earlier discussion of identity, such
Green, “Recent Polls on Immigration.”
Ibid.
184
Somerville, “Brexit.”
185
Ibid.
186
Steven Swinford; Ben Riley-Smith, “Theresa May Signals That Britain Will Leave Single Market so It Can Take
Control of Immigration,” The Telegraph, 21:57, sec. 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/07/theresamay-unveils-plans-create-shared-society-reform-vision/.
182
183

65

widespread disapproval of migration can be characterized as British rejection of the migrant
“Other.” The New Right within Britain appears to believe that in order to restore and protect the
homogeneity and purity of Britain those who lack the necessary traits of Britishness must be
excluded from the national community. In this context, those coming from the Middle East,
North Africa and within the EU itself are not compatible with what it means to be British.
Anti-elitism and the Economy
This section introduces the third cause of the ascendency of the New Right: anti-elitist
sentiments. Significantly, we live in an era of seething resentment towards elites. From Trump to
Sanders, from Syriza in Greece to Podemos in Spain, from the resurgence of the Austrian and
Hungarian far right to the rise of the Scottish independence movement, the world is rejecting
political elites’ ties to the “establishment.”187 Within Britain specifically, working-class
resentment towards elites has grown over time, perpetuating the sense of a disconnect between
the two socio-economic groups’ experiences of Britishness. “How can the less privileged
majority relate to someone who is alien to their experiences?”188 For Britain’s working class,
they cannot. Thus, in an act of desperation to protect their inclusion in a British national
community, the working-class seems to have embraced the New Right view as it opposes New
Labour’s support of cosmopolitan policy, policy enacted by the same elite class that has
continued to thrive despite the economic suffering of many. Given such sentiments this section
examines how, since 2008, tensions between the working-class and elite have only increased.
Contemporary anti-elitism in Britain can be traced back to the Great Recession and its
aftermath. Both caused economic stress for the working-class. In order to revitalize the economy
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after 2008 Britain relied on austerity policies. Problematically, however, investors, banks and big
corporations disproportionately benefited from such measures. As a result, economic recovery in
the UK has been concentrated in large metro areas including London.189 While middle and upper
class professionals have enjoyed economic prosperity since 2009, the working class has
experienced stagnant wages, social benefit cuts and increased job competition from immigrants
entering the country.190 “Trade unionism has been neutered, local government is a shadow of its
former self and political activism is, for the most part, simply shouting into the wind.”191
In addition to the domestic financial trouble, Britain has had to be patient over the last
eight years while many of its major trading partners have scrambled to recover. The eurozone
countries experienced large budget deficits, high debt levels, and uncompetitive cost
structures.192 This led to uncertainty regarding the EU’s ability to effectively address periods of
economic distress. In fact, eight years later, eurozone countries are still experiencing financial
difficulties.193 Consequently, Britons began to believe that the EU had stagnated and if Britain
remained a member it would too. In this sense, there has been a growing perception that Britain
has been collateral damage in the wake of European economic failures. This has reinforced
Eurosceptic sentiments and made the New Right’s anti-integration platform increasingly
attractive.194
In response to this slow economic recovery, Britons who reside in northern cities and
small towns began to feel as though they live in a very different world with very different views

189

Ibid.
Ibid.
191
Mark Easton, “What Did the Brexit Vote Reveal about the UK?,” BBC News, December 23, 2016, sec. UK
Politics, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38301495.
192
Peter Dizikes, “3 Questions: The Euro Mess,” MIT News, May 11, 2010, http://news.mit.edu/2010/3q-forbeseuro-0511.
193
Jeremy Warner, “The Euro Has Destroyed the EU and Led Directly to Brexit,” The Telegraph, 19:23, sec. 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/08/23/the-euro-has-destroyed-the-eu-and-led-directly-to-brexit/.
194
Warner, “The Euro Has Destroyed the EU and Led Directly to Brexit.”
190

67

than the younger elite voters that predominately live in larger metropolitan areas.195 Britain’s
working-class believes that its position within society is being threaten by this growing cohort of
young urban elites. Significantly, World War II helped make the working-class in Britain
fundamental to the country’s stability, as “the stoicism of the people in the blitzed cities and the
bravery of a conscript army transformed the position of the working class.”196 The working class
became the common people, the backbone of society, “taking up their new and now apparently
rightful place in the national community.”197 Given this newly granted position in society, the
working class today feels as though young elite politicians have diluted Britishness through
enacting cosmopolitan policies. Those who identify more closely with Powellian isolationism
have harbored long-standing resentment towards British elites, as it is thought that Thatcher’s
signing of the Single European Act was the result of a push by Britain’s upper class.198 The
product of this resentment was unveiled in 2016, as Brexit became, in part, a working-class
rebellion.
As the working-class has experienced alienation caused by elitist policies, their sense of
belonging to the British nation has been further undermined by the presence of foreign workers.
It is therefore imperative to acknowledge a degree of xenophobia underlying these economic
tensions. Increased racism and intolerance directed at migrant workers represents an effort to
restore national homogeneity and the white British worker’s rightful place in the work force —
an effort indicative of support for New Right Britishness. In this manner, the resentment felt by
the working-class was only furthered by tolerant policies that allowed migrant workers, Muslims
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and other ethnic minorities, and refugees and asylum seekers to enter Britain.199 Consequently,
the working-class’s need to preserve its Britishness has resulted in intense racism towards these
individuals. Eastern European immigrants, for example, have experienced acts of xenophobia
and bullying in both the workplace and at school. A Polish teenager in Cornwall even committed
suicide as a result of racist bullying at school just a few weeks before the Brexit vote.200
Likewise, British Chinese workers are worried about the aftermath of Brexit and how their place
in society, rights and livelihoods may be negatively affects.201
The rise of New Right Britshness was caused, in part, by the perception that political
elites do not listen to nor represent the people. Support for the New Right therefore represents an
effort to restore a sense of British national identity that favors the socio-economic experiences of
the working-class — consequently rejecting the cosmopolitan attitudes of New Labour. Britain’s
working-class became tired of being called racist, ignorant and backward-looking because it has
vocalized concerns about decreasing job security and the moving of employers to city centers.
The Brexit vote thus reflects a deep frustration caused by the alienation of the British working
class. As the proletariat, or the wageworkers, formed the foundations of the Brexit coalition, a
vote for Brexit symbolized a vote against the Oxford and Cambridge elite.202
4.2 Strength of the New Right Tradition
Britain’s New Right and New Labour notions of national identity are in tension with one
another. On the one hand, the New Labour view attempts to promote plurality, to further connect
Hsiao-Hung Pai, “When They Call Brexit a ‘working-Class Revolt’, They Mean the White British Working
Class,” openDemocracy, July 11, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/hsiao-hung-pai/when-they-call-brexitworking-class-revolt-they-mean-white-british-working-class.
200
Ibid.
201
Ibid.
202
John Harris, “Britain Is in the Midst of a Working-Class Revolt,” The Guardian, June 17, 2016, sec. Opinion,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/17/britain-working-class-revolt-eu-referendum; Junior
Sabena Mutabazi, “Brexit: The Hijacking of a Working-Class Revolt,” The New Times Rwanda, June 30, 2016,
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-06-30/201272/.
199

69

a sense of Britshness with the EU and a set of cosmopolitan policies. Young Britons from urban
areas who have propagated this notion of Britishness are less attached to civic criteria of national
identity. The New Right has, however, fought back. It has appealed to nostalgic Britons, those
who supported Powell and Thatcher’s New Right vision for the country. This vision included an
autonomous, self-governing UK—a Britain that acknowledged the European integration project
but did not directly partake in it.
Although the outcome of the independence referendum was extremely close, the Brexit
vote demonstrates that the New Right view of national identity is prevalent throughout the
country. Given the civic and ethnic conditions the New Right view advocates for, there is a
connection between New Right Britishness and Britain’s decision to leave the EU that cannot be
ignored. As highlighted by the above discussion, tensions over shifts in state sovereignty,
increased immigration and a persistent anti-elitism have allowed New Right views to gain favor
among Britons. Whether or not there is explicit understanding of the New Right view, labeled as
such, there is apparent support for certain conditions of British identity within the county,
conditions that have resulted in fifty-two percent of voters checking the Leave box.
Brexit was, in part, about reestablishing the rules and conditions that allow the country to
foster a strong sense of self. As made evident by the narrow margin by which Leave won the
vote, there is a deep divide within the UK over what it means to be British. While the three
issues analyzed in this chapter have existed since before Britain joined the EU, recent events
have exacerbated anxieties. Such events have included the continued expansion of the EU,
geographically and in the number and scope of institution, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the slow
economic recovery of EU member states after the 2008 recession. The culmination of these
events, and other like ones, created an exceptional moment in time, one that allowed for New
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Right Britishness to rise in such a way that David Cameron had to follow through on this
promise to hold an independence referendum.
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Conclusion: Confronting Exclusionary Identity Politics
On March 29, 2017 Theresa May gave notice that the people of Britain wish to trigger
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, officially beginning the formal withdrawal process. The
seemingly unlikely break up of Britain and the EU is now a reality. But what has the outcome of
the independence referendum told us about the British people? What do we learn about the
Brexit vote by considering the role identity played in the decision to leave? I have argued that the
country does not agree about whether or not Britishness includes membership to the EU.
Focusing on identity and identity politics frames Brexit as the manifestation of or reaction to
deep-seated, internal tensions over what it means to be British. This domestic dispute came to a
point of crisis on June 23, 2016 because the power and scope of supranational intuitions – the EU
– had increased, consequently transforming British state sovereignty and challenging British
national identity.
Since 1951, a united Europe has evolved from a coal and steel community allied to
prevent future violence between European countries, to a socio-political polity. The EU today is
a massive consortium of Commissions, Parliaments and Courts, each with a unique authority to
dictate what life within Europe looks like. EU Regulations, for example, are binding legislative
acts that must be applied in their entirety across member states. Although many EU Directives
are largely unenforceable, increasing oversight at the supranational level continues to influence
intra-European relationships. For fifty-two percent of the British people, transforming state
sovereignty had threatened parliamentary autonomy, strong border control and a traditional
working-class. Consequently, this perceived threat was an affront to national identity, and
therefore contributed to their decision to vote Leave.
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5.1 Turning our Backs
Understanding the reasons why the Brexit vote occurred in the first place, as well as why
the Leave campaign was victorious, is crucial to addressing potential consequences. On a
practical level, interpreting the economic, political and social grievances of fifty-two percent of
the country will inform both policy responses to Brexit and the UK’s relationship with the EU
moving forward. Problematically, both Britain’s decision to leave and the policies that are likely
to be passed will have damaging effects, physically and psychologically, on both British citizens
and citizens of other nations. What does a Brexit say to British citizens of immigrant descent?
And for those who look towards Europe as a place of economic and familial security, what
precedent does Brexit set for how refugees and migrants will be treated? As Britain
declares “We are British and not European,” or “We are British before we are European,” such
questions loom, demonstrating that both states and national borders are still fundamental to our
understanding of political authority and international relations.
Brexit raises concerns about the consequences of exclusionary identity politics and
restrictions placed on the freedom of movement. If we understand Brexit to be, in part, a reaction
to domestic debates over what it means to be British, it can be argued that Brexit was at the same
time about restoring national homogeneity — one British people, no longer threatened by the
“other,” be it European, Muslim or Cosmopolitan. British national identity, while fundamental to
the very existence of the British state and people, is at the same time so fragile it can be
compromised by the arrival of an immigrant from another country. As this analysis suggests,
however, there are deep issues at stake in regards to the promotion of exclusionary identity
politics. What happens when a state feels the need to seal its borders and strictly dictate who
belongs and who does not? What happens when the doors are closed and backs are turned on the
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world’s most vulnerable populations? In both serious and intuitive ways this very well may be a
consequence of the Brexit. The “masks” politicians so often hide behind have been removed, and
mainstream discourse is now infused with xenophobic rhetoric.
Deep ideological divides about what it means to be belong to a nation have driven
reactionary politics and invited the proliferation of promises to “make America great again,” and
to “take back control” of Britain. While the explicitly racist language used by heads of state may
make the consequences of a Brexit or Trump presidency seemingly obvious, such potential
outcomes still demand our attention. These mantras introduce dangerous contradictions,
discrediting entire national histories founded on generations of immigration and ushering in
xenophobic nationalisms. In terms of the refugee crisis that has unfolded over the course of the
last two years, exclusionary identity politics and xenophobia ignore the stark realities of
“refugeeness.” Instead of acknowledging and then acting on the fact that these refugees are
running away from war and persecution and toward the hope of a better life, this vulnerable
population has instead been portrayed as a danger to existing social structures, policy, cultural
attitudes, and, ultimately, to nationalist ideals.

5.2 Challenging Traditional Notions of Belonging
The era of globalization, of transforming state sovereignty, has demanded the conception
of citizenships that achieve both individual equality and the recognition of collective difference.
Citizenship, as a component of national identity, has, since antiquity, involved exclusion.203 That
said, the state’s ability to strictly dictate who resides within its borders has changed as the
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mobility of people has increased.204 This has affected the capacity and willingness of both state
and citizen to meet obligations traditionally inherent in modes of citizenship.205 The ability of
states to fulfill responsibilities has been weakened, and citizens have new avenues or outlets for
protection of rights and facilitation of mobility. In this sense, there are “growing opportunities
and rights outside of the sovereign, territorial state,” the EU being one such option.206
In response to the alteration of institutions of power, transforming state sovereignty and
the simultaneous expansion and concentration of peoples, technologies, and expressions of
thought, citizenship and ways of belonging to the state must change. This has provided the basis
for the emergence of global or transnational citizenship — alternative notions of citizenship that
take into account that many people now belong at various levels to different societies. In this
sense, the challenge is to integrate the global, regional, and local dimensions of belonging into a
new political model. It is necessary to devise forms of democratic political participation that
transcend state boundaries.207
Transnationalism has become one new mode of belonging, a mode that is removed from
traditional ways of belonging to, and thus identifying with, the nation-state. Castles (2002)
asserts that transnational communities are groups whose identity is not primarily based on
attachment to a specific territory. Rather, transnationalism is, in part, characterized by the
creation and maintenance of social fields that cross national boundaries.208 It involves the
negotiation of identities at the intersection of a “three-way relationship between their sending
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state, their host state and their network of fellow transnationals.”209 It therefore presents a
powerful challenge to traditional ideas of national belonging, as transnational citizens participate
in multiple political communities, typically not identifying with one particular place at any given
time.210
Global or post national citizenship is an additional framework useful for combating
exclusionary identity politics and traditional conceptions of membership to a state. It is largely
about taking a risk and pushing beyond the comfort of background, language, or nationality — all
which typically shield us from the reality of others. This calls for greater inclusivity as a defining
feature of cosmopolitanism, as it suggests that all humans belong to one moral realm or domain,
presupposing obligations to each other. Kant’s Kingdom of Ends reiterates this description of
cosmopolitanism, as it assumes greater inclusivity rooted in hospitality and global peace. 211
Thus, this reality would involve welcoming strangers and maintaining a tolerant civilization.
Of course, the challenge remains how to reconcile the prevalence of the New Right view
in Britain with a need to reimagine what belonging looks like. Despite the existence of
frameworks for transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship, application and feasibility are in
many ways insurmountable challenges not unique to the British people. This project began with
the acknowledgement that my decision to analyze the role of identity in the Brexit vote stemmed
from an attempt to pull together many interests, to pose questions that force us to reflect on and
critique the world we live in. While questions such as, “is the world ready to open borders and
minds? Are nationalist, exclusionary politics eradicable?” are certainty loaded they can be
answered quite simply. No. The world is not ready to open borders and minds. Nationalist,
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exclusionary politics are not at this time eradicable. Despite this bleak prognosis, there is comfort
in the fact that understandings of belonging seem to be in flux. There is room for both refugees
and Britons coming out of the Brexit to conceptualize new ways of claiming membership to both
local and distant communities. If not at the level of the state, alternative forms of belonging will
be forged on the ground, defying the will of those who seem so determined to turn their backs on
human decency.
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